This paper investigates how the implementation of monetary policy affects the dynamics and the volatility of the federal funds rate. Since the early 1980s, the most important changes in the Fed's conduct of monetary policy refer to the role of the federal funds rate target and the reserve requirement system. We show that the improved communication and transparency regarding the federal funds rate target has significantly increased the Fed's influence on the federal funds rate since 1994. By contrast, the declining role of required reserves in the U.S. has contributed to higher federal funds rate volatility. Our results suggest that the planned introduction of remunerated required reserves will further enhance the controllability of the federal funds rate.
Introduction
For many central banks, overnight money markets are the key channel through which monetary policy is executed. Overnight rates, like the US federal funds rate, are the operational targets of monetary policy that signal the policy-intended interest rate level. Since the 1980s, many central banks, including the Federal Reserve (Fed), have redesigned their monetary policy instruments to ensure that the overnight rate closely follows the central bank's key policy rate and that its volatility remains well contained. 1 The current paper examines how major developments in the monetary framework of the Fed have influenced the dynamics and the volatility of the federal funds rate.
For the U.S., the most obvious changes in monetary policy implementation refer to the increasing role of the federal funds rate target. Before February 1994, the Fed's interest rate target was more or less implicit and had to be inferred by the public from the Fed's open market operations, see Thornton (2006) . Since then changes of the federal funds rate target have been announced and explained immediately after the Fed's interest rate decision. The introduction of a balance of risk statement in 2000 might have further improved the communication and transparency of monetary policy, see Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) . With a view to the planned introduction of remunerated reserves in 2011, our second focus is on the role of required reserves for the volatility of the federal funds rate. During the 1990s, sweep account programs have significantly undermined the reserve base in the U.S. and, thus, the ability of required reserves to act as an interest rate smoothing liquidity buffer, see e.g. Woodford (2000) .
Our paper is related to the growing literature on the volatility and the dynamics of overnight interest rates. Following the seminal paper by Hamilton (1996) , recent examples include Bartolini and Prati (2006) and Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal (2006) . Both contributions show that the central bank's operational framework influences the behavior of overnight rates.
They do not consider, however, the effects of changes in the role of the central bank's interest rate target, the central bank's communication policy, or the level of required reserves. 2 In line with the empirical literature, we adopt the EGARCH-framework to model the mean and the time-varying volatility of the daily federal funds rate. In order to capture probably important long-run equilibrium relations governing the federal funds rate dynamics, we specify the mean equation of the EGARCH model as error correction equation where the federal funds rate adjusts to two interest rate spreads. First, in accordance with the expectations theory of the term structure, the federal funds rate (i) may respond to the term spread, defined as the 1 See Bindseil and Nyborg (2007) for a recent overview of central banks' monetary implementation. 2 A notable exception is Colarossi and Zaghini (2007) who argue that the improved communication of the Fed ameliorated the transmission of overnight rate volatility to longer term interest rates.
spread between the three month Treasury bill rate and the federal funds rate (i3 − i). Ignoring the presence of a federal funds rate target, Sarno and Thornton (2003) found a significant but asymmetric response of the federal funds rate to the term spread. Yet, given the importance of the federal funds rate target (i * ) for the implementation of monetary policy in the U.S., the response of the federal funds rate to deviations from its target should not be neglected.
Following models of the European overnight rate suggested by Benito, León, and Nave (2007) and Nautz and Offermanns (2007) , we additionally account for the policy spread (i − i * ) as a second error-correction term governing federal funds rate dynamics. In the current paper, however, we explore how the implementation of monetary policy affects the federal funds rate.
In particular, we test whether the adjustment of the federal funds rate to deviations from its target depends on the importance and transparency of the federal funds rate target.
Changes in monetary policy implementation may also affect the volatility of the federal funds rate. In particular, preliminary evidence provided by Bennett and Hilton (1997) , Wrase (1998), and Hilton (2005) suggests that high reserve requirements stabilize the federal funds rate. In order to test whether required reserves contribute to lower interest rate volatility, we include a normalized measure of required reserves in the volatility equation of the federal funds rate.
Our results clearly indicate that improved communication and transparency of monetary policy decisions significantly enforce the adjustment of the federal funds rate to its target. Therefore, a well-communicated implementation of monetary policy enhances the Fed's control over the federal funds rate. In the same vein, results from the volatility equation show that the introduction of the balance of risks assessment has further contributed to stabilize the federal funds rate. By contrast, the declining trend in required reserves has increased interest rate volatility in the U.S. Since remuneration decreases the opportunity cost of reserve holdings, our results suggest that the planned introduction of remunerated required reserves will further enhance the controllability of the federal funds rate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the interest rate data and reviews the increasing role of the federal funds rate target in U.S. monetary policy implementation from 1984 to 2007. Section 3 describes the development of reserve requirements and their possible impact on the volatility of the federal funds rate. In Section 4, we present the empirical model designed to test the implications derived in Sections 2 and 3 for the effects of monetary policy implementation on the dynamics and the volatility of the federal funds rate.
Section 5 summarizes our main results and contains some concluding remarks.
2 The increasing role of the federal funds rate target in the implementation of monetary policy
The communication of the federal funds rate target
During the 1980s, the Fed made increasingly use of an interest rate target in the formulation of its monetary policy decisions. In the literature, there is some ambiguity about the exact date the Fed began to target the federal funds rate. Hamilton and Jorda (2002) date the beginning of the explicit interest rate targeting at the end of the 1980s. Thornton (2006) interprets the FOMC verbatim transcripts and concludes that the Fed has targeted the federal funds rate already from 1982 onwards. Following Hamilton (1996) , our sample period starts in March 1984. This allows us to consistently base the empirical analysis on a time period in which the underlying reserve maintenance period covers two weeks.
The increasing importance of the federal funds rate target is reflected in the disclosure practice of the Fed. Until January 1994, the target rate was rather implicit and the market had to Although the statement is not meant to give a binding direction for the immediate next step of monetary policy, the market uses the statement to form expectations about the near future, see Rasche and Thornton (2002) . 3 Lapp and Pearce (2000), Kuttner (2001) , Lee (2006) , and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) take a closer look at the communication strategy of the Fed. Lapp and Pearce (2000) find that the bias in the FOMC policy directive is largely consistent with ensuing interest rate decisions. Kuttner (2001) outlines the importance of preparing market participants to target rate changes in order to stabilize market rates. Lee (2006) finds a 1-day response of federal funds rate volatility to unexpected changes in the target rate. According to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) , the market anticipated interest rate decisions earlier and reacted less strongly after the introduction of the forward-looking component in the FOMC statement. In particular, the response of short term interest rates to interest rate decisions may depend on the direction of the FOMC bias.
In the following, we account for these implications on the effects of monetary policy implemen- Hilton (2005) , low values of the target rate limit the downward potential of the federal funds rate implying a relation between level and volatility of the federal funds rate. In the following, we will also test whether high interest rate levels tend to coincide with high interest rate volatility.
Interest rate spreads and monetary policy communication regimes
A first look at the policy spread suggests that the Fed's steps towards more transparency have made monetary policy implementation more effective. Apparently, the policy spread (i−i * ) has gradually become tighter and less volatile since the early 1980s, see Figure 1 . Table 1 The way how monetary policy is implemented may also affect the behavior of the term spread Figure 2 . Note that the spread has a negative sign throughout the sample period which stems from the exemption of three-month Treasury bills from some local and state taxes, see Sarno and Thornton (2003) . Similar to the federal funds rate and the policy spread, both the mean and the standard deviation of the term spread and the Treasury bill rate have decreased over the sample period. Notes: All statistics are derived from daily data. The effective federal funds rate is the overnight interbank rate for federal funds (reserves).
3 The declining role of reserve requirements in the implementation of monetary policy
Reserve requirements and interest rate volatility
In contrast to the reserve requirement systems of the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, reserve balances are not remunerated in the United States. As a result, they represent a cost for depository institutions implying that banks aim at operating at reserve levels as low as possible. Since reserve holdings at the Fed provide some leeway for banks in managing their deposits, operating at minimum reserves may well go together with temporary squeezes and thereby translate into a higher volatility of the federal funds rate. To increase the efficiency of its reserve requirement system, the Fed recently decided to pay interest on reserves from
October 2011 onwards.
Following Wrase (1998) , reserve requirements can affect the volatility of the federal funds rate primarily in two ways. First, banks use their accounts at the Fed not only to hold reserves but also to settle payments with other banks. However, if banks minimize their reserve holdings by using e.g. sweep account programs, reserves might be reduced below the amount necessary to settle payments. 4 As a consequence, liquidity shocks can lead to large swings of the federal funds rate. Second, reduced reserve holdings hamper the Fed's liquidity management, because banks' demand for reserves to settle payments varies more than their demand to meet reserve requirements. Consequently, higher reserve holdings should represent a liquidity buffer which facilitates both, banks' reserve management and the Fed's supply of reserves. Accordingly, higher reserves should contribute to lower volatility of the federal funds rate. In contrast to Wrase (1998) , the model by VanHoose and Humphrey (2001) produces ambiguous theoretical predictions on the effect of reserves on interest rate volatility. Figure 3 shows that the level of required reserves has varied considerably since 1984. In particular, it declined sharply since about 1990, when the Fed eliminated required reserves on non-transaction deposits. A second remarkable decline followed in April 1992 because the Fed lowered the reserve ratio on transaction deposits from 12 to 10 percent. With the rapid expansion of sweep account programs in 1995, reserve requirements fell steadily until the opportunities to extend sweep accounts were largely exhausted in 1999. 5 Figure 4 shows reserve requirements normalized by total deposits, i.e. by the sum of transaction and nontransaction deposits, in order to account for the upward trend of total deposits, see Figure   5 in the Appendix. Normalizing reserve requirements by total deposits captures both, the decline in reserve requirements due to the exemption of non-transaction deposits from the reserve base and the distorting effect of sweep account programs, which could not be achieved by normalizing by transaction deposits, see Brunner and Lown (1993) . 6 According to O'Brien (2007) , interest rate smoothing can nowadays be seen as the main reason for imposing reserve requirements. Yet, the available evidence on the impact of required reserves on the dynamics and volatility of the federal funds rate is surprisingly mixed and elusive. A descriptive analysis from Wrase (1998) indicates that intra day volatility of the federal funds rate strongly increased during the first months after the exemption of non-transaction deposits of the reserve base and slightly increased with the sweep account programs since 1995. Bennett and Hilton (1997) report similar findings for the sweep account practice. Empirical results obtained by Brunner and Lown (1993) suggest that there is a negative, albeit small, influence of the reserve ratio (measured by reserve requirements divided by transaction deposits) on the volatility of the federal funds rate. Finally, Ayuso, Haldane, and Restoy (1997) provide indirect evidence in favor of the hypothesis that reserve requirements stabilize interest rate volatility.
They observe that countries with higher reserve requirements tend to have a lower volatility of short-term interest rates. In order to shed more light on this issue, our empirical model for the 5 Anderson and Rasche (2001) report that the use of deposit-sweeping software began to spread slowly in January 1994, the spreading accelerated after April 1995.
6 Previous studies often considered the level of reserve requirements, see Bennett and Hilton (1997) , VanHoose and Humphrey (2001) , and Hilton (2005) . To test for a liquidity effect in the federal funds market, Carpenter and Demiralp (2008) disaggregate total balances banks hold at the Fed into their components of required reserve balances, excess reserve balances and contractual clearing balances. Interestingly, they find that changes in the federal funds rate significantly influence excess balances and contractual clearing balances but do not affect required reserve balances. Although this distinction seems appropriate in their analysis, it appears less important in our context, see Figure 6 and subsection A.2 in the Appendix.
federal funds rate allows to test whether reserve requirements on total deposits actually lower the volatility of the federal funds rate. Notes: Reserve requirements divided by total deposits.
Reserve accounting rules and interest rate dynamics
Average reserve accounting In a system of average fulfilment of reserve requirements, rational banks should arbitrage away any predictable pattern of the federal funds rate during a maintenance period. As a consequence, the federal funds rate should follow a martingale process. However, Hamilton (1996) found predictable patterns of the federal funds rate during the maintenance period. For example, the federal funds rate tends to move downwards on Friday and increases again on Monday. Moreover, the federal funds rate is typically higher on the last day of the maintenance period reflecting the so-called Settlement Wednesday tightness.
This effect may have changed since August 1998, when the Fed began to supply more liquidity during the last days of a maintenance period. The violation of the martingale hypothesis has been confirmed by many other authors, see e.g. Prati, Bartolini, and Bertola (2003) . In particular, there is consensus about an increased volatility and tightness on Settlement Wednesdays, see Furfine (2000) .
Contemporaneous versus lagged reserve computation Our empirical analysis of the federal funds rate behavior shall account for further institutional details of the reserve accounting practice that might influence the volatility of the federal funds rate. In 1998, in particular, the Federal Reserve switched from contemporaneous to lagged reserve computation in order to facilitate banks' reserve management and to reduce the volatility of the federal funds rate.
Under contemporaneous reserve computation banks only knew their definite level of reserve requirements on the penultimate day of the maintenance period, see e.g. Gilbert and Trebing (1982) . The higher uncertainty under the contemporaneous accounting system may well translate into a more erratic level of reserve holdings and thus a higher variation of the federal funds rate compared to the system of a lagged accounting practice, see Lasser (1992) and Lee (2002) .
Since banks know the required reserves in advance of a maintenance period, the introduction of lagged reserve requirements in July 1998 should have mitigated the volatility of the federal funds rate.
Discount window Finally, the volatility of the federal funds rate might have been influenced by the new operation procedures for the utilization of the discount window introduced in September 2003. These new procedures were supposed to facilitate and encourage banks'
borrowing from the Fed of short-term funds. Although banks hardly made use of this possibility, the mere knowledge of its presence might have contributed to a stabilization of the federal funds rate, see Furfine (2003 Furfine ( , 2005 .
4 An empirical model of the federal funds rate
Variables and predictions
In this section we present and estimate the empirical model designed for testing the empirical relevance of the implications of the Fed's monetary policy implementation on the federal funds rate. Following the empirical literature, the dynamics and volatility of the federal funds rate are modeled in an EGARCH framework where equations explaining the conditional mean and the conditional variance are estimated simultaneously via Maximum Likelihood. Equation (1) shows the specification of the mean equation of the federal funds rate.
In order to account for the economic long-run relations governing the federal funds rate, the mean equation is specified as error-correction equation, see e.g. Benito, León, and Nave (2007) and Nautz and Offermanns (2007) . The federal funds rate (i) adjusts to deviations from its target, i.e. the policy spread (i − i * ), and, in line with the expectations theory of the term structure, to the term spread (i3 − i). However, the response of the federal funds rate to both interest rate spreads may depend on the prevailing monetary policy implementation regime. Table 1 , we also included these dummy variables as regressors to capture regime-dependent mean shifts. Following Hamilton (1996) , the mean equation (1) of the federal funds rate additionally includes the change of the federal funds rate target, lagged differences of interest rates and dummy variables accounting for various calendar effects (X 1 ).
The volatility equation (2) emphasizes the role of the Fed's communication policy and of the reserve requirement system for the federal funds rate: Finally, we control for FOMC meeting days by the dummy D F OM C and for the level of the federal funds rate target as suggested by Hilton (2005) .
The second group of variables refers to the reserve requirement system. The reserve ratio rr t
is defined as reserve requirements (RR) divided by total deposits (T D).
Reserve requirement data denote the daily average a bank has to hold on every day of a maintenance period. Under contemporaneous reserve requirement computation, we instrument for the required reserves of the current maintenance period by a lag of one period. Total deposits are averages over one week, ending on Wednesday. Therefore, we use a lag of one week as the closest proxy for current deposits, see Equation (3).
under contemporaneous reserve requirement computation Table 6 in the Appendix.
Empirical results for federal funds rate dynamics and volatility
We estimated the empirical model of the federal funds rate, (1) and (2), with daily data from 1 March 1984 to 8 August 2007. 7 Table 2 summarizes the results for both, the mean and the volatility equation of the federal funds rate. In the Appendix, we present the complete set of estimated coefficients (Tables 4 and 5 ) including a discussion of calendar effects and their implications for the martingale hypothesis, see Hamilton (1996) .
The response of the federal funds rate to interest rate spreads For both interest rate targeting regimes, the estimated coefficients of the policy spread (α 1 ,α 2 ) indicate a highly significant adjustment of the federal funds rate to its target. In line with theoretical predictions, the immediate announcement of interest rate decisions introduced in February 1994 strengthened the adjustment of the market rate to the official rate. Wald tests confirm that the coefficients significantly depend on the Fed's interest targeting regime. Whereas 47 percent (α 1 ) of a target rate deviation is corrected within a day before February 1994, the daily adjustment has risen to 69 percent (α 2 ) since then. In line with Nautz and Scheithauer (2008) , the persistence of the U.S. policy spread has significantly decreased since February 1994.
According to the estimation results obtained for the coefficients β 1 , β 2 , the federal funds rate adjusts significantly to the term spread. However, the adjustment coefficients appear very small. In particular, the introduction of the balance of risks assessment did not lead to a stronger adjustment of the federal funds rate to the term spread. Rather, the federal funds rate target turns out to be the main stabilizing factor for the federal funds rate. Sarno and Thornton (2003) find much larger adjustment coefficients related to the Treasury Bill rate.
However, their findings might be biased due to the omission of the policy spread. In particular, in contrast to Sarno and Thornton (2003) , we do not find that the adjustment of the federal funds rate depends on the sign of the term spread. 8
7 The sample period does not include interest rate data distorted by the recent liquidity crisis. The analysis of the effects of the liquidity crisis on the behavior federal funds rate is left for future research.
8 Results obtained for asymmetric error-correction equations are not reported but are available on request. Sarno and Thornton (2003) focus exclusively on the relationship between the Treasury bill and federal funds rate. They estimate a cointegrating vector of (i, i3) = (1, −1.15) while the expectation hypothesis implies that interest rates of longer and shorter maturities should be cointegrated with (i, i3) = (1, −1), see Campbell and Shiller (1987) . In our sample period, unit root tests show that the term spread can be assumed to be stationary, see Table 3 in the Appendix. Wald test on parameter equality H 0 : Same speed of adjustment of the federal funds rate to the Policy spread pre/post 1994: α 1 = α 2 0.000 Term spread pre/post 2000:
Notes: Estimation on basis of daily data. HAC consistent, absolute t-values in parenthesis. * * / * denotes significance at the 1%-/5%-level. The estimated model is presented in Equations (1) and (2). Wald statistics are presented as p-values. See Tables  4 and 5 in the Appendix for detailed estimation results and Table 6 in the Appendix for a description of variables.
Interest rate targeting regimes and federal funds rate volatility The lower part of Table 2 summarizes the results obtained for the volatility equation (2) of the federal funds rate. To begin with, the results confirm the presumption by Hilton (2005) that higher target rate levels are accompanied by higher volatility of the market rate: the estimated coefficient (θ 1 = 0.045) is significantly positive. The dummy variables indicating the three communication regimes show that a higher transparency helps to reduce the interest rate volatility. While the new disclosure practice in 1994 (θ 2 = −0.119) only had a slightly negative effect on volatility, a much stronger reduction resulted from the introduction of the balance of risks assessment in January 2000 (θ 3 = −1.314). Note that the direction of the Fed's bias published in the FOMC policy directive and in the balance of risks assessment has also a significant impact on federal funds rate volatility. Specifically, an easing bias (θ 4 = 0.321) leads to higher volatility while a tightening bias leads to a slightly lower volatility (θ 5 = −0.09) of the federal funds rate compared to a neutral assessment, see Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) . Finally, in line with earlier findings by Kuttner (2001) , the significantly positive coefficient of D F OM C (θ 6 = 0.158) indicates that the market seems to be more active and volatile on FOMC meeting days relative to days of the intermeeting period.
The impact of the reserve requirement system on federal funds rate volatility Our results strongly support the hypothesis that relatively high reserve requirements stabilize the federal funds rate. In particular, the estimated coefficient of rr (θ 7 = −23.305) indicates a significantly negative relationship between required reserves on total deposits and federal funds rate volatility. This implies that sweep account programs, which particulary expanded in the second half of the 1990s, contributed to increased federal funds rate volatility. However, there is evidence that reforms of the Fed's operational framework helped to stabilize the federal funds rate. For example, the introduction of lagged reserve requirement computation in August 1998 considerably reduced (θ 8 = −0.260) the uncertainty of banks about their reserve requirements and facilitated the reserve management. Following Prati, Bartolini, and Bertola (2003) , the lower volatility of the Federal funds rate since August 1998 may have been reinforced by the Fed becoming more active in the market. The facilitated access to borrowing from the Fed due to the new design of the discount window (θ 10 = −0.436) apparently further stabilized the federal funds rate. Following Furfine (2005) , the mere presence of the new lending facility may have had a stabilizing effect on the federal funds rate. Finally, the volatility equation confirms the well-known phenomenon of higher overnight rate volatility on the last day of the maintenance period (θ 9 = 1.337) for countries with average reserve requirements, see e.g. Hamilton (1996) for the U.S. or Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal (2006) for Germany and the euro area. Our results show that the volatility of the federal funds rate decreases with the level of required reserves (normalized by total deposits). This effect confirms the function of reserve balances at the Fed of facilitating the settlement of payments in the interbank market, see e.g. Hilton (2005) and Bennett and Peristiani (2002) . In particular, the sweep account programs of the mid-1990s have contributed to an increasing volatility of the federal funds rate. The result also adds to the current discussion following the decision of the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves from 2011 onwards. 9 Paying interests on reserves is supposed to broaden the reserve base and consequently should increase reserve requirements. As a consequence, our empirical findings suggest that the planned introduction of remunerated required reserves will decrease the volatility of the federal funds rate in a significant way. 
A Appendix

A.1 Figures
A.2 Alternative measures for required reserves
We further checked the robustness of the estimation results by employing (1) total reserves and (2) required reserve balances as alternative measures for required reserves. As Figure 6 shows, total reserves are relatively close to required reserves, except for days around 11 September 2001. Also, required reserve balances, which are required reserves less vault cash, develop similar to required reserves. The alternative estimation results, which are available on request, confirm the robustness of our results. 
A.3 Stationarity tests
A.4 Federal funds rate behavior and the martingale hypothesis
In accordance with Hamilton (1996) , Table 4 shows significant calendar effects and a predictable pattern in the federal funds rate within a maintenance period. Contradicting the martingale hypothesis, our estimates show a lower federal funds rate on Fridays and a higher rate on the second Monday of a period. Hamilton (1996) finds this effect on both Mondays. The tightness of the money market on Settlement Wednesday is confirmed until July 1998. During this period, the Settlement Wednesday coefficient indicates that the federal funds rate increases by 16 percentage points relative to the previous day in addition to the regime-dependent base effect. Daily fluctuations normally deviate from the base effect by less than 5 percentage points.
Apparently, the behavior of the federal funds rate on Settlement Wednesday has changed due to the additional liquidity injections by the Fed since August 1998. Since then, the federal funds rate tends to decline on the last day of period by approximately 2 percentage points relative to the base effect. Thornton and Wheelock (2000) ) and of the balance of risks assessment afterwards (own calculations based on FOMC statements). The corresponding values are assigned to them on FOMC decision days and remain valid during the consecutive intermeeting period. Neutral assessments are not indicated separately.
